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Current Population Trends of Special Importance for Planning in Latin America

The adequacy of present planning programs throughout Latin America will be determined to a considerable degree by the extent to which realistic appraisals of population trends figure as components in those programs. Specifically, in this context, four specific demographic developments deserve special consideration. These are as follows: (1) the tremendous speed with which the population of the twenty Latin American countries is increasing; (2) the overwhelming extent to which the natural increase of the population in the various countries is being siphoned off from the rural districts and concentrated in and about the principal cities; (3) the strong tendency for the rural-urban migrants of lower-class status to aggregate in huge "bands of misery," or suburban slums, in the areas adjacent to cities, extensive areas occupied by squatters in which the work of "urbanization" has hardly begun; and (4) the failure of the numerous offsprings of the agricultural families to move into, conquer, and bring into production vast areas throughout Central and South America that still are lacking inhabitants.

Each of these will be discussed briefly in turn, but prior to that a few words of caution will be given pertaining to the uncritical adoption and use of expressions and ideas which, although they may from time to time gain widespread popularity in connection with demographic matters, are hardly entitled to pass as legal tender in any genuinely scientific discussion of population topics.

Demographic Sophisms Now **Circulating Widely**

Currently, the most startling example of the native acceptance and glib use of misleading demographic terms may be seen in the almost universal employment of the term population "explosion" as the designation for the present high rates of population increase. It hardly seems possible that this could have taken place were it not for the universal fears of mankind with respect to grave consequences that might accompany men's .efforts to domesticate and control the atom. These fears apparently have enabled some of those who seek support for their proposed population policies to play upon the emotions of men and women, rather than to appeal to their critical judgments, to produce an association in millions of minds between the fantastic destructiveness of unleashed atomic energy and the high rate of population increase. Actually, until the basic meanings of an entire family of words in all of the languages derived from Latin sources, are altered radically, it would be difficult to discover a more inappropriate designation than

that of "explosion" for the steady, prolonged, and rapid rate of population increase presently taking place in the world, and especially throughout Latin America. Were there actually to be a population explosion, the phenomenon would consist of one instantaneous disruptive, and destructive release of pent-up energy, after which the pulverized remnants would all qucikly return to their previous level. Such a thought obviously is utterly ridiculous and inconceivable in anything having to do with population changes. Even a less radical figure of speech such as the eruption of a geyser, hardly can appeal to critical minds as being appropriate in connection with the growth of human numbers. Rather the population phenomenon resembles the rise of the water level in a tank in which two faucets (births within the area involved and migrations to it) add to the volume of the liquid and two outlets (deaths in the area involved and migrations from it) tend to decrease the amount of water in the tank. To continue this figure of speech, until recent decades throughout Latin America the faucet chiefly responsible for the addition of numbers (the birth rate) was wide open, resulting in a rate of inflow of from 45 to 50 per 1000 population per year; and the major outlet (the death rate) also was unobstructed so that from 35 to 40 persons per 1000 population were decimated annually. As a result the population rose steadily but with no great rapidity. Since 1925, however, the application of vaccinations, innoculations, the safeguarding of milk and water supplies, and a host of other measures based upon the germ theory of disease have greatly reduced the death rate, or, to follow our analogy, have closed, to a considerable extent, the principal outlet of the tank. The birth rate, though, has remained high, so that the inflow has continued unabated. As a result, the volume of liquid in the tank, or the number of inhabitants, has continued to increase steadily and constantly, but now, the rise is no longer slow. It is moving upward at a very rapid rate. Let us stress, though, that there is nothing even remotely resembling an explosion taking place, nor even an eruption such as that of a geyser. Moreover, this is indeed fortunate for those involved in planning programs; for if there were any basis for thinking of current population increase as an explosion, any attempts at planning for or with the people of various cities, states, and nations would be of the utmost futility. My point here is, of course, that all of those involved in planning activities should use the same critical faculties in connection with the concepts offered them by demographers that they employ in connection with the terms they must deal with which come from geology, civil engineering, physics, chemistry and all the other sciences.

Another sophistic practice which is comparable to having counterfeit coins pass as legal tender, particularly in planning circles, is the tendency to think of population increase largely as an independent variable, instead of the dependent variable which it generally is. There appear to be two principal reasons for this. First, there is the insatiable appetite on the part of municipal, state, and national agencies for speculations of any type with respect to what the population of the administrative unit with which they are concerned will be ten, twenty five, or fifty years hence. Of course, were it possible to know, or to estimate with any reasonable degree of accuracy, how many people there would be in 1980, 2093, or 2025 in Buenos Aires or Maxico City, the state of Sao Paulo or the Provincia of Lima, in Colombia, Venezuela or any of the other countries, and so on, the problems of planning would be reduced to a mere fraction of what they actually are. Hence, I fear, there is a strong tendency for us to substitute the wish for the reality, and for us to forget the fundamental fact that the three factors

(births, deaths and migrations) whose combined effects produce observed population changes themselves are the net products of hundreds of specific social, economic, and political influences. We tend to think, I fear, of the changes in the numbers of human beings principally as an antecedant and not as a consequent. Of course, this is matched in other aspects of current social and economic theorizing such as that which seems almost to attribute volition of their own to statistical indexes of the cumulative effects of hosts of influences, such as the "gross national product" or an indicator of price levels on the stock market.

As a result of this dubious way of thinking, of the failure in social and economic matters to distinguish between cause and effect, or at least to recognize that a given factor, such as the changing number of inhabitants, is fully as much, if not more, an independent as it is dependent variable, the so-called population "projections" appear to be a *sine qua non* of planning projects. Thousands of people seem to be fascinated with the particular kind of "numbers game" which this represents, and the variety of forms it takes is truly a thing of wonder. Actually, of course, the process calls for the minimum in the way of sophistication and the maximum in the way of repetitious, tedious arithmetical calculations. Always fundamental in the process is the *assumption* that if the rate of increase remains as it was during some period, or *if the* factors remain unchanged, or *if* the latter change in a certain way, *then* after the lapse of stated periods of time the population will be so and so.

For some curious reason, those who do, or who employ clerks to do the thousands of simple arithmetical computations involved, apparently feel no obligation to supply their clients with any indications of their best professional judgment, based on all of the knowledge which presumably they possess, as to what the population of a given center^ state or nation actually will be ten, twenty or fifty years hence. They merely present the results of the tedious computations as to what would *be* the case *if* their simple assumptions should prove to be correct. In reality this never, or almost never, proves to be the case. If anyone will take the trouble to compare the results of projections made ten, twenty or thirty years in the past with the actual trends since those projections were published, the one thing that will prove crystal clear is that the projections never approximate the actual trends. Specifically, if the projection indicates that the population of a given territorial unit will be a given number in 1980, or 1990, or 2000, the one thing of which we may be sure is that such actually will not be the case. This is true even of the most elusive procedures of all in which the "professional" passes on to the "layman," for the latter's own selection and use, not just one but three or more "projections" dubbed variously as "high" "medium," "low" and soon. It is certain, though, that these dubious practices will continue until those in the planning profession develop a sophistication about population matters sufficient to cause them to refuse to accept such obvious counterfeits as "coin of the realm." As is probably apparent to those who read these words, I absolutely refuse to have any part in the making of population projections. I will, however, venture my best judgment, or estimate, of what the population of a given city, country, state or nation, will be at one or more dates in the immediate future, based upon my knowledge of the factors involved, the observed trends in each of them, and the changes in these factors that seem most likely to take place. Even so, since the fluctuations in the birth rate, which seem to be largely unpredictable, constitute the principal determinant in most of the equations for states and nations, I recognize that any such estimate is subject to a very large margin of error.

The Hnge Upsurge in the Population

Nowadays, those writing about demographic subjects are employing a rich variety of superlatives to denote the rapidity with which the population is increasing in the world as a whole and its various subdivisions. Except for such spurious terms as "population explosion", these superlatives are more appropriately applied to what is taking place throughout Latin America than to the trends in any other large section of the earth's surface. All during the second quarter of the twentieth century, the growth of population in the twenty Latin American countries went on at a pace substantially greater than that for other great world regions, and considerably above the rates of increase in the Latin American nations themselves during the opening quarter of the century and those prevailing throughout the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries. Moreover, since 1950, the speed with which the population of Latin America has been growing itself has been on the increase, so that between 1950 and 1960 the coefficient of growth was higher than that for the period 1940 to 1950, and that for 1960 to 1975 promises to be even higher than the extremely high indexes previously attained.

Some statistical data properly used will help us to place the current rates of population growth in Latin America in their proper prospective. No attempt is made to go back further than 1900, though, since prior to that date the lack of census data and the obvious inconsistencies in and unreliability of the various estimates blur the picture for the nineteenth and eighteenth centuries. When the twentieth century opened, however, it would seem that there were approximately 1,630 millions of persons on the earth, of whom about 43 millions, or around 2.7 per cent , were inhabitants of the twenty Latin American countries. Two decades later, or just after the close of the first world war, the world's total population had risen to some 1,811 millions, while that of the Latin American nations had mounted even more rapidly to a total of about 89 millions or fully 4.9 per cent of all. After 1920 the health programs in the various parts of the world, aided immensely by the work of the Rockefeller Foundation, began to reduce the death rates substantially, and the pace at which the earth's inhabitants were increasing quickened considerably, so that by 1940 there probably were about 2,250 million living members of the human race; but again during this twenty year period, the rate of population increase in Latin America greatly excelled that for the remainder of the world, so that by 1940 Latin Americans alone had come to number about 123 millions, of 5.5 per cent of the earth's inhabitants. The conflagration which afflicted the world between 1940 and 1950 slowed the rate of population increase to some extent but certainly did not halt it even in Europe and Asia, and probably did not affect it at all throughout Latin America. In any case, by 1950, when the total population of the world had grown to about 2,510 millions, there were at least 154 million Latin Americans, or 6.0 par cent of those alive at that date. Subsequently, during the decade ending in 1960, the number of people on the earth's surface shot upwards rapidly to a mark of 2,995 millions, with the increase in Latin America still in the vanguard. Thus, in 1960 the combined population of the twenty countries involved was 202 millions, and it accounted for 6.8 per cent of all the people in the world. By 1970 the comparable figures were 276 million Latin Americans, constituting 7.7 per cent of the world's population.

These materials may be summarized succinctly by indicating that in 1900, there was only one Latin American in every 37 members of human race, whereas by 1970 this

ratio was one out of every 13. Thus a phenomenal change is under way, a change that constitutes a major challenge for all of us who have a responsibility in connection with the plans and policies for the future wellbeing of the people in the neighborhoods, communities, states and nations in which we live. Moreover, this rapid increase of the population of the Latin American countries probably will continue until at least 1980, when a substantial decline in the birth rate may get under way. In the near future, though, the proportion of Latin Americans in the world's population will continue to rise, probably to about one in every 12 in 1980.

The rates of growth involved in the above discussion approximate, for Latin America as a whole, about 3 per cent per year for the decade 1960 to 1970. This is my best judgment as to what the rate actually was, an index that has been by no means easy to establish. This in turn represents an upturn from one of about 2.5 for the decade ending in 1950. Moreover, one would be amiss were he to fail to mention that a rate of 3 per cent per year is almost unprecedented for the population of any substantial portion of the globe on which we live. As far as can be ascertained throughout the entire history of mankind no other extensive area on earth, with the single exception of the United States between 1790 and 1860, has previously, experienced a rate of population growth equal to 3 per cent per year. In terms of the numbers of additional human beings that must figure in the projects of those responsible for planning activities, this means that in the years that have just passed there have been more than eight million Latin Americans alive at the end of a year than there were at its beginning.

Another feature of current population increases in Latin America is the extent to which the exceedingly high rates prevail throughout the many, far-flung, and widely diver-gent parts of Mexico and Central America, the three island republics, Brazil, and the Spanish American parts of South America. Thus in Brazil, which alone contains more than one-third of the total population of the twenty countries, and for which the reported increase as shown by the 1960 and 1970 censuses amounted to 30 per cent, only six of the twenty six states and other major civil divisions registered increases in population of less than 25 per cent during the decade and eleven of them showed increases of over 35 per cent. Mexico, the second most populous of the Latin American countries, experienced a 38.8 per cent increase of population between 1960 and 1970. And current rates of growth are above three per cent per year in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. In the entire group comparatively slow growth of population is exhibited only in Argentina and Uruguay, where the present rates are about 1.5 and 1.2 per cent per year, respectively.

The Dizzy Pace of Urban Growth

Despite the universality of high current rates of population increase in Latin America, in terms of national and state units, a startling redistribution of population is going on within each of the countries and within the principal subdivisons of each of them. In brief, the overwhelming part of the population increase is accounted for by the growth of cities and towns. This is not because the rate of natural increase, or the difference between births and deaths, in urban districts exceeds that in the rural areas, for the opposite is the case; rather it is chiefly because a very large proportion of the children born and reared in the rural districts are flocking into the state and national capitals, and into other urban places, as soon

as they reach the ages of early adulthood. In this connection my studies in Brazil, Colombia, and some of the other countries, indicate that approximately two-thirds of the increase of population in the urban districts is due to migration from the rural areas.[1] But this rush to the cities is new. It would find no place of importance in the projections of the populations of various cities made twenty five years ago; and, indeed, an interesting realm for speculation and study is to be found precisely in the question as to why, after centuries of existence as societies that were overwhelmingly rural, agricultural, and pastoral in nature, the Latin American countries suddenly were caught up in a mad rush to urbanize, industrialize, and "modernize" almost literally overnight ?

Rather than spending our limited space on speculations, though, let us examine some of the most important data on the subject. At mid-century only about 19 millions, or 36.5 per cent, of Brazil's population were classified in the urban category. Nevertheless, between 1950 and 1970 her urban population increased by 33 million, or by about 173 per cent, whereas the rural population, in this vast country where at least half of the national territory is entirely or almost entirely devoid of inhabitants, increased by only 8 million or 24 per cent. Thus during the latest two intercensal periods, in the half continent called Brazil, over .80 per cent of the total increase of population took place in cities and towns, the most publicized feature of which, of course, was the phenomenal growth of the two great conurbations of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Each of these presently contains at least seven million inhabitants. But the immense flow of people from the country to the city was, by no means, confined to these two gigantic centers.

Actually on the relative basis the burgeoning of such cities as Belo Horizonte, capital of Minas Gerais, with a population of 1,233,000 in 1970 and Fortaleza, capital of the great northeastern state of Ceara, with well over 840,003 inhabitants in 1960, was even more spectacular than the growth of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. Furthermore, both Recife and Salvador have grown so fast that each passed the one million mark prior to 1970, while the list of places having over half a million residents now includes not only Porto Alegre, with 886,000 inhabitants, but Belem, Curitiba, and Brasilia as well. In addition such places as Manaus, Sao Luis, Teresina, Natal, Joao Pessoa, Maceio, and Goiania are Meccas for so many of those who leave the rural districts that all of them have grown in the cities having more than 200,000 residents. As a matter of fact it must be stressed that in some areas, and especially in the much-publicized northeastern region of Brazil, that nation's problem area number ONE, the mushrooming of cities and towns was accompanied by almost no increase in the rural population. Thus between 1950 and 1960 percentage increases in the urban and rural populations, respectively, of the most of the northeastern states, and the major entities in the eastern region as well were as follows: Piaui, 75 and 10; Ceara, 66 and 10; Rio Grande do Norte, 71 and 1; Paraiba, 55 and 4; Pernamubco, 59 and 2; Alagoas, 50 and 4; Sergipe, 44 and 6; Bahia, 67 and 9; and Minas Gerais, 70 and 9. Nor was the situation much different in the other populous sections of the country. Thus in the great southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, an increase of 72 per cent in the urban population was accompanied by one of only 9 p;r cent in the rural population; in the State of Rio de Janeiro, the corresponding indexes were 90 per cent and 10 per cent respectively; and in justly famed Sao Paulo, an increase of 3,346,000 (or 70 per cent) in the urban population dwarfed in significance that of only 495,000 (or 12 per cent) in the rural population. Moreover, when the

details from the 1970 census become available they are almost certain to show even greater rural urban differentials than these.

Such are a few of the most pertinent facts about the mushroom growth of cities in Brazil, the country for which the data are most satisfactory at the time these lines are written. Perhaps, though, one additional comment should be made. If Brazilian planners follow the pattern which is general throughout North and South America, that is to say if they concentrate their attention almost exclusively upon the problems of the urban centers to the neglect of the vast rural areas, they will still have many, many more towns and cities to take into account. In Brazil alone, places of 2,000 or more inhabitants increased from only 900 in 1940, to 1,174 in 1950, and to 1,799 in 1960; and it probably will not require another twenty years from the latter date for this number to double again.

Changes comparable to those in Brazil also took place in Mexico, second most populous country of Latin America. As late as 1950, only 43 per cent of her 26 million inhabitants fell in the urban category; but during the ensueing twenty years Mexico's urban population mounted by 140 per cent, whereas her rural population rose by a mere 35 per cent. As a result, by 1960, Mexico had joined Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela in the small group of Latin American countries having predominantly urban populations. And by 1970 her urban population of 26,329,000 made up 56.8 percent of the total population. At the time of Mexico's 1970 census enumeration, the Federal District already was far too small to contain the huge built-up area of Mexico City, the capital. Nevertheless, it alone contained 6,874,000 inhabitants. Moreover, although between 1950 and 1970 the rate of growth in this immense city was 125 per cent, it was less rapid than that for the nation's urban population as a whole, which indicates that the phenomenal increase in the number of residents of cities and towns was, by no means, limited to the capital. For example, between 1950 and 1970 the populations of three other major cities swelled as follows : Guadalajara, from 377,016 to 1,195,000; Monterrey, from 333,422 to 858,000; and Puebla, from 211,331 to 402,000.

The data from Argentina's 1970 census of population are not yet available to me in the detail needed for the most meaningful analyses of current trends. By 1960, however, three fourths of Argentina's population already fell in the urban category, and the entire urban population was highly concentrated in the immense city of Buenos Aires and the satellites just beyond its own limits. In fact, the data for the period 1947 to 1960 make it evident that the bulk of the growth of population took place in the huge crescent-shaped agglomeration of minor civil divisions *(Partidos)* immediately adjacent to the capital city. During the intercensal period, the 17 divisions in this area more than doubled in population, with the actual change being from a total of 1,741,000 in 1947 to 3,647,000 in 1960. Among the most spectacular increases were those in the following *partidos :* La Matanza, from 98,000 to 403,000 (309 per cent); Merlo, from 20,000 to 135,000 (575 percent); Quilmes, from 123,000 to 318,000 (158 per cent); and San Martin, from 270,000 to 541,000 (93 per cent). It is almost certain that this great tendency of Argentina's people to concentrate in the urban areas within the perimeter to Greater Buenos Aires was even more pronounced between 1960 and 1970 than it had been in the previous 13 years.

During the 1970's Colombia is almost certain to replace Argentina as the third most populous of the Latin American countries, and in it, as in Brazil, Mexico and Argentina,

the redistribution of population now underway on a huge scale is concentrating the population in the major cities and the immense suburban bands of misery that surround them. Colombia's latest census was taken in 1964 and the latest intercensal period covers the years 1951 to 1964. During that time, the nation's population increased from 11,548,000 to 17,485,000 (51 per cent), with the growth in the head towns *(cabeceras)* of the county-like *municipios* being from 4,468,000 to 9,903,000 (105 percent) and that in the remainder, the strictly rural sections of the country, being from 7,080,000 to 8,391,000 (19 per cent). By 1964, 27.6 per cent of the population resided in cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants. For the 15-year period, the annual rate of growth of population averaged 3.2 per cent for the nation as a whole. And during those years, the changes in the principal cities were as follows: Bogota, from 715,000 to 1,697,000, 6.8 per cent per year; Medellin, from 358,000 to 773,000, 6.0 per cent per year; Cali, from 284,000 to 638,000, 6.3 per cent per year; and Barranquilla, from 280,000 to 498,000, 4.5 per cent per year. Since 1964, the growth of Colombia's major cities has been fully as spectacular as it was between 1951 and 1964.

Data for the other Latin American countries are not yet available to the degree to justify a continuation of this line of analysis. It is certain, though, that the tendency of the people to flock into cities of all sizes in the other countries has been fully as great as it has been in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Colombia.

Suburban Slums That Spring up Overnight

Although the statistical data needed for the most adequate type of demonstration are lacking, and probably will never be gathered and collected in a thoroughly satisfactory manner, one may be fairly certain that the growth of population has been especially rapid on the outskirts of the cities. Indeed, the huge belts of misery and deprivation which surround all or almost all of the Latin American cities surely are growing far more rapidly than are the central cities themselves. As a matter of fact, the most appropriate figure of speech available for use in describing the rise of these "suburbios", is its likeness to the way in which toadstools spring up over night. The lion's share of all these unwanted and unmanageable aggregations of population involve illegal squatting on public or private properly. They feature the quick erection of huts and hovels that are entirely devoid of facilities for disposing of wastes from human bodies and with improvised kitchens. They are lacking all other services including (light and water) and are built according to no plan whatsoever, therefore even on a very small scale, they would constitute a challenge to planners of overwhelming dimensions. In the magnitude with which these "barrios marginales" actually are springing up, the degree to which this aspect of urbanization (as the word is used in English, and particularly by sociologists and economists) is outrunning *urbanizajion* or *urbanizaacao* (in the sense these words are used by architects, engineers, and those in charge of development projects throughout the Spanish American countries and in Brazil) constitutes what now is probably the most important social or societal problem in Latin America.[2]

The Slow Pace of New Settlement

Here and there throughout Latin America an energetic thrust of new settlement is bringing an extensive area of virgin territory into cultivation and adding a broader base

to the economy of one of the countries. In the 1970's, this is especially true in Brazil. But this is not general, and at the pace at which the occupation of the unsettled sections of South and Central America is going on, it will be centuries before large portions of Bolivia, Peru, Colombia Venezuela, and some of the Central American countries will make any significant contribution to the welfare of mankind. Here again the lack of detailed information from two or more recent censuses limit greatly the scope of any studies that maybe made of the phenomenon, but enough information is available to make crystal clear the lack of any comprehensive onslaught upon the uninhabited portions of Latin America. Fortunately, the information from the 1950 and 1960 censuses in Brazil have been tabulated with a promptness and attention to comparability of data for small territorial units that well might serve as a model for other countries to emulate. To benefit as much as possible by this information, the present writer has underway a comprehensive study of the redistribution of population in the rural sections of Brazil and on the basis of the tables and maps already prepared, and a general knowledge of the distribution of population and population trends in Brazil, certain generalizations may be made. Thus for the period 1950 to 1960 it is evident that the only portions of that great country in which there were any large and sustained efforts to bring new areas into production are as follows : the northern part of the State of Parana; the north central portion of Maranhao; the districts in Goias which are fairly close to the new capital, Brasilia; the Rio Doce Valley and the area just to the north of it in Minas Gerais; and the extreme northwestern section of Sao Paulo.

The changes in Brazil between 1960 and 1970 did not differ from those during the previous decade in any great respect, except that the building of the road from Brasilia, the new national capital, to Belem, great entrepot of the immense Amazon Valley, attracted about two million people into the previously unoccupied zone adjacent to it. Perhaps this was the major stimulus that caused those who direct the fortunes of the huge half continent to launch the greatest road building and colonization efforts in the nation's history. In any case, in 1970 a gigantic undertaking to builtd a highway from the Atlantic Coast to the Peruvian border, an artery of transportation almost across the continent of South America at its widest part, was launched. This highway is designed to connect all of the heads of navigation on the southern tributaries of the Amazon River, and the zones on either side of it are to be settled with farmers on allotments of land of about 250 acres in size, all grouped about new villages, towns, and small cities. It is one of the most grandiose attempts to plan a redistribution of population that has ever come to my attention.

Elsewhere in Latin America there are thrusts of new settlement here and there into virgin territory , but extensive areas are still to be colonized. As in Brazil, the huge expanses of unsettled territory in the Spanish American portions of the vast Amazon Basin offer tremendous opportunities for large numbers of well-prepared agricultural and non-agricultural people. The same is true of most of the territory drained by the Orinoco and the Paraguay rivers. It is my own considered opinion that within the next few decades huge populations will be attracted into these potentially fruitful regions. Therefore, as a conclusion to this Paper, I quote the judgment I expressed a few years ago about the development of the immense plains that lie to the east of the Andes and constitute very large portions of all the territory in Colombia and Venezuela, "I continue to believe that such projects as the construction of a modern highway built on almost a bee line from

Caracas, Venezuela to Villavicencio, at the base of the Andes, a short distance to the east o Bogota, Colombia, would be of as much consequence in the development of South Americft as the Aswan Dam will be in that of Africa."[3]

1. See, for example, T. Lynn Smith, *Brazil: People and Institutions,* Fourth edition, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972, pp. 148-150: and-.T. Lynn Smith, *Latin American Population Studies,* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960, pp. 56-59.

2. For some of the general information about the rapid growth of the "suburbs," see T. Lynn Smith, "Los Problemas Sociales de la Actualidad on la America Latina," in *Memoria, VI Congress Latino-americano de Sociologia,* Tomo **II,** Caracas: Imprenta Nacional, 1961, pp. 419-423; and for a detailed study of the haphazard way of life characteristic of them see- Manuel Zabala C., *Estudio Social sobre tin Barrio de Invasion,* Cali: Facultad de Arquitectura, Universidad del Vellel 1964. For one of the more ambitious projects for planning and putting into effect the measures needed to correct the measures needed to correct the situation, at least in part, in Gobierno de Peru, *Ley de Remodelacion, Saneamiento y Legalization de los Barrios Marginales,* Lima: Senado de la Repulica, 1961. See also, Republica, 1961. See also, Smith, *Brazil,* Chapter XXII and XXV.

3. T. Lynn Smith, "Studies of Colonization and Settlement," *Latin American Research Review,* Vol IV No. I (Winter, 1969), p. 109.